Comments and Reviews
How Much Do Non-Cash Components and Externalities Affect the Impact of Cash Transfers?
How Much Do Non-Cash Components and Externalities Affect the Impact of Cash
Transfers?
by Rafael Perez Ribas, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign; Fábio Veras Soares and Clarissa Teixeira, International Policy
Centre for Inclusive Growth; Elydia Silva, Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES);
and Guilherme Hirata, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de
Janeiro
Much of the debate
about conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes revolves around the issues of
targeting and conditionalities. Despite the many impact evaluations of CCT
programmes, mostly in Latin America, there is little evidence on either the
effect of the cash alone or the value added by the
conditionality.
Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager111.pdf
Posted at 11:37AM Jul 14, 2010 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs | Comments[0]
Can Public Works and Employment Programmes Be More than Safety Nets?
Can Public Works and Employment
Programmes Be More than Safety Nets?
By Radhika
Lal
in the context of counter-cyclical programme interventions and
responses to shocks. In some cases they have also focused on reducing poverty or
addressing structural unemployment challenges over the longer term, but they
have seldom been implemented on a scale that would make a dent in structural
poverty. Recent advances in conceptualising and implementing scalable PEPs
suggest that these programmes also have a broader development role to play.
http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager112.pdf
Posted at 11:36AM Jul 14, 2010 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs | Comments[0]
The Programa Subsidio de Alimentos in Mozambique: Baseline Evaluation
The Programa Subsidio de Alimentos in
Mozambique: Baseline Evaluation
By Fabio Veras Soares, Guilherme Issamu Hirata and Rafael
Perez Ribas
I. Introduction
The Food Subsidy Programme (Programa Subsidio de Alimentos, PSA) is the main basic social protection programme
of the government of Mozambique in terms of coverage. It was established in 1990
to help the destitute elderly (women above 55 and men above 60), people living
with a disability, the chronically sick and their dependants by providing a
monthly cash transfer. The programme falls under the mandate of the Ministry for
Women and Social Action (MMAS), while implementation is the responsibility of
the National Institute for Social Action (INAS), the Ministry’s executing
agency.
By the end of 2008, the PSA
covered 143,455 households with a total of 287,454 beneficiaries. The main
direct beneficiaries were the elderly (93 per cent), followed by people living
with disabilities (6 per cent) and the chronically ill (1 per cent). The general
eligibility criteria are: age, residency for more than six months in the
selected area, per capita earnings less than the minimum benefit on the PSA
scale, and/or recognised by medical declaration to be chronically ill or living
with a disability. Potential beneficiaries are selected by a local intermediary
(known as a Permanente) chosen by the community and appointed by INAS,
after which the application undergoes an approval process within the INAS
delegation.
Although the PSA is a national
programme, it does not reach the entire eligible population and its coverage is
unequally distributed across districts. This is the result of the absence of an
expansion strategy based on poverty incidence and population density. Expansion
of the PSA was initially restricted to urban areas in order to mitigate the
effects of the post-war structural adjustment programme on the urban population
(Low et al., 1999). Currently, expansion to remote rural areas is a programme
priority. The programme’s administrative cost is considered high relative to the
amount transferred to the beneficiaries (Ellis, 2007). Though the programme is
the largest in terms of the number of beneficiaries, its coverage is low
relative to the potential universe of beneficiaries. Expansion of the programme
tends to diminish the administrative costs in relative
terms.
In 2008, the PSA underwent two
important reforms. First, the subsidy scale increased. The subsidy amount for
the first (direct) beneficiaries rose from 70 to 100 meticais (US$2.5 to
US$3.6), and the additional benefit for dependants increased from 10 to 50
meticais (US$0.36 to US$1.80) per dependant up to four. The second reform was
the greater focus on the inclusion of eligible dependants as indirect
beneficiaries in the payment scheme, and the monitoring and evaluation system.
http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/port/IPCPolicyResearchBrief14.pdf
Posted at 11:39AM May 11, 2010 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs | Comments[0]
Benefiting Without Receiving Money? Externalities of Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes on Schooling, Health and the Village Economy
I.
Introduction
Although cash transfer programmes
have been implemented and evaluated for more almost a decade, very little is
known about how they affect households that are located in communities where the
programme is implemented but that are not officially registered for the
programme
(either because they are ineligible or are unwilling to
participate). The vast majority of evaluations focus on households that are
officially registered. Cash transfer programmes, however, are likely to affect
all households living in a community, even those that are not
participating.
By Christian Lehmann
Posted at 11:38AM May 11, 2010 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs | Comments[0]
Direct or Mediated Relationships? Civic Involvement and Social Accountability in the Bolsa Família Programme
Conditional Cash
Transfer (CCT) programmes are key to reducing the effects of the
economic crisis among the poor in Latin America. Their implementation, however,
entails two risks: an increase in political clientelism (exchange of votes for
favours) and the widening of the power gap between the poor population and local
authorities. In order to gain access to the programme and receive financial aid,
families rely on the authorities in charge of registering beneficiaries and
checking compliance with conditionalities. As a result, government actors enjoy
a better power position at the local level and/or are able to ask for political
support in return.
Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager105.pdf
Posted at 12:11PM Feb 12, 2010 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs | Comments[0]
What Is the Impact of the Bolsa Família Programme on Education?
Many researchers have shown that
Brazil’s Bolsa Família programme had a large impact on reducing poverty and
income inequality. But evidence for the programme’s impact on educational
outcomes is in short supply. Does Bolsa Família increase school enrolment? Does
it reduce dropout rates? Does it improve grade promotions?
Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager106.pdf
Posted at 12:10PM Feb 12, 2010 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs | Comments[1]
The Doha Round and Kenya: Good and Not So Good Lessons
The global financial crisis and spiking unemployment figures have raised the threat of escalating barriers to trade. An early conclusion to the Doha Round might help avert some of the increase in protectionism, but no one knows by how much. And while Doha will help the world economy, it will also create winners and losers across countries and across sectors within countries (Polaski, 2006). How much developing countries can win
or lose depends, to a large extent, on how the issue of agricultural subsidies in developed countries is resolved. But it also depends on the definition of sensitive commodities and the effects of further liberalising trade in manufacturing goods. Developing countries will have to look very carefully at the gains and losses from proposed Doha Round agreements, the so-called “modalities”. For many developing countries, the nature of any agreed package will be more important than reaching any agreement by a specific deadline.
Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager102.pdf
Posted at 02:54PM Jan 14, 2010 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs | Comments[0]
Do CCTs Lessen the Impact of the Current Economic Crisis? Yes, but...
The recent financial and economic crisis has sparked a debate on whether conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes make families less vulnerable to that crisis. This link between the crisis and CCTs was made because countries like Brazil, which have large CCT programmes, were enduring the impacts better than most others.
Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager96.pdf
Posted at 09:01AM Sep 16, 2009 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs | Comments[1]
Do CCT Programmes Have a Pro-Poor Spillover Effect?
Conditional Cash Transfer programmes (CCTs), such as Progresa in Mexico or Bolsa Família in Brazil, have been compared to a “magic golden bullet in development”. A plethora of rigorous evaluations of such programmes points to a significant increase in food consumption among cash-recipient households. A topic that has not received much attention yet is the impact of cash transfer programmes on the food consumption of households that do not receive the transfer (programme-ineligible households) but that are in the same village as cash recipients.
Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager98.pdf
Posted at 08:45AM Sep 16, 2009 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs | Comments[1]
What Is the Impact of Cash Transfers on Labour Supply?
This One Pager investigates the impact of the Brazilian Conditional Cash Transfer Programm, the Programa Bolsa Família (PBF), on beneficiaries’ decision to supply their labour. The theoretical departure is this: households have a time allocation strategy between housework activities and paid work. Income shocks, such as cash transfers, alter such time-allocation preferences. In other words, they change the relative value of time.
We assume that paid work hours do not generate any additional well-being to households, except for increases in income. As cash transfers increase income, paid time loses value relative to unpaid time. Therefore, the expected behaviour is a reduction in the supply of paid work hours and an increase in housework or leisure hours.
Posted at 08:33AM Jun 22, 2009 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs | Comments[4]