Comments and Reviews

Direct or Mediated Relationships? Civic Involvement and Social Accountability in the Bolsa Família Programme

Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes are key to reducing the effects of the economic crisis among the poor in Latin America. Their implementation, however, entails two risks: an increase in political clientelism (exchange of votes for favours) and the widening of the power gap between the poor population and local authorities. In order to gain access to the programme and receive financial aid, families rely on the authorities in charge of registering beneficiaries and checking compliance with conditionalities. As a result, government actors enjoy a better power position at the local level and/or are able to ask for political support in return.

 Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager105.pdf

Posted at 12:11PM Feb 12, 2010 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs  |  Comments[0]

What Is the Impact of the Bolsa Família Programme on Education?

Many researchers have shown that Brazil’s Bolsa Família programme had a large impact on reducing poverty and income inequality. But evidence for the programme’s impact on educational outcomes is in short supply. Does Bolsa Família increase school enrolment? Does it reduce dropout rates? Does it improve grade promotions?

Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager106.pdf

Posted at 12:10PM Feb 12, 2010 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs  |  Comments[0]

The Doha Round and Kenya: Good and Not So Good Lessons

The global financial crisis and spiking unemployment figures have raised the threat of escalating barriers to trade. An early conclusion to the Doha Round might help avert some of the increase in protectionism, but no one knows by how much. And while Doha will help the world economy, it will also create winners and losers across countries and across sectors within countries (Polaski, 2006). How much developing countries can win
or lose depends, to a large extent, on how the issue of agricultural subsidies in developed countries is resolved. But it also depends on the definition of sensitive commodities and the effects of further liberalising trade in manufacturing goods. Developing countries will have to look very carefully at the gains and losses from proposed Doha Round agreements, the so-called “modalities”. For many developing countries, the nature of any agreed package will be more important than reaching any agreement by a specific deadline.

Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager102.pdf

Posted at 02:54PM Jan 14, 2010 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs  |  Comments[0]

Do CCTs Lessen the Impact of the Current Economic Crisis? Yes, but...

The recent financial and economic crisis has sparked a debate on whether conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes make families less vulnerable to that crisis. This link between the crisis and CCTs was made because countries like Brazil, which have large CCT programmes, were enduring the impacts better than most others.

Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager96.pdf

Posted at 09:01AM Sep 16, 2009 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs  |  Comments[1]

Do CCT Programmes Have a Pro-Poor Spillover Effect?

Conditional Cash Transfer programmes (CCTs), such as Progresa in Mexico or Bolsa Família in Brazil, have been compared to a “magic golden bullet in development”. A plethora of rigorous evaluations of such programmes points to a significant increase in food consumption among cash-recipient households. A topic that has not received much attention yet is the impact of cash transfer programmes on the food consumption of households that do not receive the transfer (programme-ineligible households) but that are in the same village as cash recipients.

Download: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager98.pdf

Posted at 08:45AM Sep 16, 2009 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs  |  Comments[1]

What Is the Impact of Cash Transfers on Labour Supply?

This One Pager investigates the impact of the Brazilian Conditional Cash Transfer Programm, the Programa Bolsa Família (PBF), on beneficiaries’ decision to supply their labour. The theoretical departure is this: households have a time allocation strategy between housework activities and paid work. Income shocks, such as cash transfers, alter such time-allocation preferences. In other words, they change the relative value of time.

We assume that paid work hours do not generate any additional well-being to households, except for increases in income. As cash transfers increase income, paid time loses value relative to unpaid time. Therefore, the expected behaviour is a reduction in the supply of paid work hours and an increase in housework or leisure hours.

Posted at 08:33AM Jun 22, 2009 by IPC in Social Protection and CCTs  |  Comments[4]